Archived research v1. Preserved for reference; its assumptions have not been revalidated for the new research.
The original study
5 · The La Montgolfière case
Edition dated 7 September 2026
💡 The closest comparable to the project, reverse-engineered, and the two interpretation errors that needed correcting.
Reference points and estimates for the comparable
The reconstructed membership numbers and costs are unaudited. This case describes how the offer is structured; it does not establish published profitability.
Canal (Paris 10th arrondissement)
- 1,700 m² (not 2,000: the LinkedIn figure was overstated)
- Announced cap of 1,500 to 1,800 members per site (founders' statement, 2019, never audited); ~1,200 members at normal operating levels
- Membership around €190
- 14 Technogym machines: a deliberately limited equipment set, ~€200k
- A large dining area, with low actual spending but high brand value
- No coworking
Lamarck (Paris 18th arrondissement)
- Club + coworking / flexible office space (~300 m²)
- Opened after Canal
The two corrections
Correction 1: the coworking attribution. I had placed the flexible office space at Canal, based on a mislabeled broker listing. Checking both clubs' official pages confirmed that Lamarck has the coworking space, not Canal. Correction 2: floor area and equipment. 1,700 m² and 14 machines, not 2,000 m² and a full gym floor. This correction reduces the equipment budget from ~€560k to ~€200k and raises the maximum sustainable rent from €385 to €571/m²/year. Both corrections point in the same direction: the actual model is leaner than I had assumed.
What the timeline shows
The initial interpretation, “the club is not the business, the real estate is,” was wrong precisely because it rested on the mistaken coworking attribution. The correct reading follows the timeline:
- Canal provides an example of a club without coworking. The dossier uses 1,700 m² and estimates around 1,200 members at €190. Without operating accounts, the site's profitability is unproven.
- Lamarck adds another layer. The flexible office space arrives at the second club, after the first club opened, on a site with enough room for it. The hypothesis is that the social space contributes to retention, willingness to pay and differentiation. This effect needs to be measured; it cannot be inferred from the presence of the space alone.
What this changes for the project
- Do not expect coworking to rescue the club's economics. It did not do so at the comparable; it came later.
- A limited equipment set is a choice, not a budget constraint. It frees up budget for rent and social space.
- €190 in Paris's 10th arrondissement is the upper benchmark. Outside Paris, the €140–190 range applies, calibrated to the local affordability ratio.
⚠️ A caution on membership numbers. Two figures circulate for Canal, and they mean different things: the announced cap (1,500–1,800) and normal operating levels (~1,200). Relative to the catchment within a 15-minute walk in the 10th arrondissement, they imply capture rates of 5.0% and 3.3%, respectively. This is where the ranges of 4–5% to fill the club and 2–3% to break even come from. Neither figure is audited. This is the dossier's most consequential assumption.