What we are
Three things under one roof, for one persona (30–45, CSP+ or independent, trains 3–5×/week, already pays €30–40 a class in a boutique studio and would rather have one place that is studio, gym, spa, café and office):
Train, together. Coached group classes are the product — reformer, Hyrox, strength, cycling, mobility, run and trail sessions that leave from the club, and signature formats you can't find elsewhere. The gym floor is there, but it is on top, not the reason you join.
Recover & measure. Sauna, hammam, cold plunge, massage; a performance lab (VO2max, gait, body composition) and blood-test partnerships (Lucis-type) so members track health, not just workouts.
Belong. Café, coworking, events, a capped membership. Health replaces nightlife as the reason to gather.
The AI coach ties it together: it knows your tests, your training, your recovery, and programs your week. Members pay nothing extra for something the best apps charge €50–120/month for.
Why €179 is not expensive
The comparison is not the €25 gym; it is the boutique studio our persona already uses. Outside Paris, a reformer or Lagree class costs €28–38 drop-in, €25–35 in a 10-pack, and €220–350/month unlimited with a six-month commitment (Marseille: Studio Apato €30 / €245 unlimited; Wondercamp €35 / €289; Aix: Capsule €35 / €350; Bordeaux: Lagree Lab €35 / €239; Lyon: Yes Club €40 / €390–430). Cycling and HIIT sit at €20–30 a class, CrossFit in Marseille at €92–95/month for three sessions a week. A member doing two boutique classes a week already spends €250–300/month, for one discipline, in one room, with no spa, no café, no lab.
At €179 we are the price of five drop-in classes. Unlimited classes across every format, plus recovery, plus the lab, plus the place. That is the value proposition in one line, and it is the reason the price filters for the right member rather than scaring them off.
Why now
- Health is the new reason to train: 52% of French exercisers cite health first (2025), Gen Z is 46% of new gym sign-ups (2026), and fitness penetration in France (~10%) is half of Spain/Netherlands.
- Loneliness is a market: 24% of French adults report frequent loneliness, 28% in cities over 100k.
- The category exists and works: La Montgolfière filled 1,500 members at €195/month in 14 months; Remedy Place, Othership and Rune prove recovery-led social clubs. Nobody has taken this outside Paris.
The plan — five clubs, then the network
- 2027
Club 1 opens (Marseille)
Demand: paid memberships, retention, referrals
- 2028
Club 2 (2nd city)
Repeatability beyond the founder's network
- 2029
Club 3
The playbook works with a hired team
- 2030
Clubs 4–5 + first franchises signed
The brand travels without our capital
- 2031+
20+ franchises, first hotel partnerships
Network effects: one membership, many cities
Franchise (from year 4). Two formats: the full club (1,000–1,500 m²) and a compact format (coached classes + recovery, no gym floor). We supply the brand, the playbook, the programming and the AI stack; the franchisee supplies the building and local capital.
Hotels (year 5+). Health-centered hotels with a partner operator: we bring the club, the programming and the AI; the partner brings the property. Members travel between cities and sleep in the network — the Soho House move, without owning real estate.
Equity story — two layers
40–50%Local equity
50–60%Bank debt
The holding (what investors buy). Owns the brand, the AI coach and the operating playbook; holds the franchise and hotel rights and a controlling stake in each club. Raises a seed now (~€1.5–2M: HQ, AI product, pre-opening of club 1) and a Series A at three clubs. This is where the multiple lives: a network + tech asset, not a chain of gyms.
One SPV per club (how clubs get built). Each club is its own company, ~€2–2.5M all-in, funded 40–50% by local business angels and family offices (the Montgolfière model — different investors per club) and 50–60% by bank debt. Local investors get a local, cash-generating asset; the holding keeps control and the upside of the network.
Exit paths. Strategic (fitness or hospitality groups building premium networks), private equity at network stage, or a hospitality partnership vehicle for the hotel layer.
EBITDA story
The financial story follows the club model. Each opening adds its own membership ramp, operating costs and opening investment. The group then carries the central team and the shared AI training coach. AI is included in membership: its costs are budgeted, with no separate coach or licence revenue in this forecast.
Earlier margins start with the launch.
40% of capacity at opening; 18 months to target membership.
Selecting a preset restores its starting assumptions. Both pages use the same saved inputs and shareable model links.
Compare Base and Aggressive · first club
| Launch assumption / outcome | Base | Aggressive |
|---|---|---|
| Members at opening | 356 · 40% capacity | 534 · 60% capacity |
| Months to target | 18 | 9 |
| Sustained positive trading EBITDA | Month 11 | Month 2 |
| Sustained 20% trading margin | Month 19 | Month 10 |
| Sustained 30% trading margin | Not within 36 months | Not within 36 months |
| Trading margin at target | 24.2% | 24.2% |
| Opening member acquisition | €118.9k | €178.4k |
| 36-month funding including reserve | €2.14m | €1.90m |
The aggressive case changes opening membership and ramp speed. Price, churn, capacity and costs stay identical. Monthly trading EBITDA starts after opening; launch costs remain in funding and in the group’s opening-year EBITDA. No separate AI coach revenue is assumed.
One club’s economics. Each opening added.
Base scenario · 5 clubs by 2033. Every location follows the current Business Model inputs.
Club trading EBITDA − pre-opening expenses & founding-member acquisition − central costs = group EBITDA. The AI coach is included in membership. Its build, shared platform and member usage are costs; no retention uplift, licensing, franchise fees or external AI sales are built into these projections.
Annual figures & EBITDA reconciliation
| Year | Clubs | Revenue | Site trading EBITDA | Launch expenses | Central recurring | AI initial build | Group EBITDA | Margin | Cash flow | Cumulative cash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2027 | 1 | €882,334 | -€104,854 | -€198,904 | -€276,000 | -€40,000 | -€619,758 | -70.2% | -€1,929,770 | -€1,929,770 |
| 2028 | 2 | €2,150,690 | €163,692 | -€198,904 | -€336,000 | -€0 | -€371,212 | -17.3% | -€1,693,224 | -€3,622,994 |
| 2029 | 3 | €3,474,192 | €519,373 | -€198,904 | -€396,000 | -€0 | -€75,531 | -2.2% | -€1,409,543 | -€5,032,538 |
| 2030 | 5 | €5,183,715 | €774,917 | -€397,808 | -€486,000 | -€0 | -€108,891 | -2.1% | -€2,758,916 | -€7,791,454 |
| 2031 | 5 | €6,341,778 | €1,421,578 | -€0 | -€516,000 | -€0 | €905,578 | 14.3% | €845,578 | -€6,945,875 |
| 2032 | 5 | €6,617,508 | €1,778,406 | -€0 | -€516,000 | -€0 | €1,262,406 | 19.1% | €1,202,406 | -€5,743,470 |
| 2033 | 5 | €6,617,508 | €1,778,406 | -€0 | -€516,000 | -€0 | €1,262,406 | 19.1% | €1,202,406 | -€4,541,064 |
Central recurring costs include the shared AI platform once. Usage costs sit with each club. Pre-opening costs and founding-member acquisition are expensed in each opening year; the AI initial build is expensed once in year one. Cash flow also pays fit-out, equipment, contingency, deposits and replacement investment. Launch expenses are paid once. Group cash excludes debt, equity, interest and tax. The first-club financing inputs stay in the Simple and Full model tabs.
Peak funding requirement: €9.05m in Jul 2030, including a €1.12m reserve at that point. A positive EBITDA year can still require financing for subsequent openings.
Edit opening calendar & central costs
These are editable planning allowances. January is month 1. Each location repeats the same floor area, price, costs and ramp; set an opening month to 0 to remove that location.
Month 1 is January of this year. Calendar dates are a scenario, not a committed opening schedule.
Each owned club repeats the selected single-club assumptions and membership ramp. Month 1 is the first January. Zero removes this club; club labels do not impose an opening order.
Each owned club repeats the selected single-club assumptions and membership ramp. Month 1 is the first January. Zero removes this club; club labels do not impose an opening order.
Each owned club repeats the selected single-club assumptions and membership ramp. Month 1 is the first January. Zero removes this club; club labels do not impose an opening order.
Each owned club repeats the selected single-club assumptions and membership ramp. Month 1 is the first January. Zero removes this club; club labels do not impose an opening order.
€15k is an illustrative editable allowance, not a staffing benchmark. Excludes site teams and the separately modelled shared AI platform.
€5k per open club is an illustrative editable expansion-support allowance, additional to the central base. No AI or franchise fees are earned internally.
AI coach allowance: €40,000 once to build, €3,000 per month for the shared platform, plus €2.00 per active member at 60% adoption. Edit these in Full model → Costs. They are planning inputs, not supplier quotes.
Original draft economics · superseded by the live model
One club at maturity (indicative, from v1 model + benchmark): 800–900 members × ~€138 net/month ≈ €1.5M membership + 20–25% ancillary (coaching, recovery à la carte, tests, F&B, events) ≈ €1.8–2.0M revenue, 30–35% site EBITDA (~€0.6M). Year 1 is negative; monthly EBITDA turns positive around month 8; payback ~4 years.
The group (illustrative, 5 owned clubs then network):
| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2033 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owned clubs open | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Franchises | – | – | – | 3 | 8 | 20+ |
| Group revenue | ~€0.9M | ~€2.5M | ~€4.5M | ~€7M | ~€10M | ~€14M |
| Group EBITDA | ~–€0.3M | ~€0.2M | ~€0.8M | ~€1.5M | ~€3M | ~€5M+ |
| Margin | – | – | ~18% | ~22% | ~30% | ~35% |
Three levers drive the curve: (1) site EBITDA at 30–35% once a club is full; (2) HQ costs (€1M/year) diluted over more sites; (3) fee income at 70–80% margin — franchise entry fees (€50–80k), royalties (6% + 2% marketing) and the AI/tech licence (€2–3k/month per site, incl. hotels). By 2031 fees are ~10% of revenue and ~25% of EBITDA; that is what moves the multiple.
The AI edge
The AI training coach is part of the club experience from launch. Included in membership, it connects training, recovery and progress between visits.
- For members: personalised guidance and a continuous view of their progress.
- For the club: a retention and conversion hypothesis to test through adoption, attendance and renewals. Neither scenario automatically lowers churn or removes human coaches.
- For the network: shared programming and member profiles across future locations. The platform is budgeted once centrally, with usage costs for each club.
The business case includes development, ongoing product support and active-member usage. Separate AI subscriptions and partner licence revenue are zero in the forecast. Licensing remains a longer-term option.
The starting point is Remi’s personal coaching project. Explore the Hybrid Coach prototype ↗ Sign-in required.
Original AI draft · long-term options
Remi built the coach for himself; it becomes the product's nervous system. Three roles:
- For members: included. Programs training and recovery from real data (VO2max, blood markers, sleep). Perceived value €50–120/month, marginal cost near zero → retention and price justification.
- For franchisees and hotels: licensed. The AI plus the programming library is the reason to franchise us rather than open a gym.
- For the network: one member profile across cities and hotels. The data layer is the moat a copycat club can't buy.
The star
An athlete or public figure at the capital, not on a poster: equity-for-presence, co-designs programming, hosts a few events a year, opens their network. Three profiles to test, ideally rooted in Marseille:
- Marseille champion — a swimmer from the Cercle des Nageurs (Florent Manaudou or Camille Lacourt type): local, aspirational, health-not-nightlife.
- Hybrid / endurance figure — a French Hyrox elite, trail or triathlon athlete with a strong community and content habit; matches the training pillar and Remi's own network.
- Longevity voice — a doctor, sports scientist or performance coach with a media presence; credibilises the recovery and testing pillar.
The choice is a brand decision: profile 1 sells the city, profile 2 sells the training, profile 3 sells the health.
What we ask, and what we prove next
Seed for the holding, one SPV for Marseille, and three weeks of validation (site, price, presales) before anyone writes a cheque. Everything above is a hypothesis until a member pays.
The context / The counterargument
The four trends we ride.
Companion to the Vision note. Part 1 states the trends with the numbers that hold up. Part 2 attacks them the way a VC would, and lists what the story is still missing. Sources at the end; anything not sourced is flagged.
Same four trends, seen from the other side of the table.
Social clubs are a thing
What it means for us: the format is validated, the price point (€195/month in Paris) is validated, and the money is flowing — but every French example is in Paris. Nobody has done it in a French regional city.
The trend · Read the evidence
The gym is turning into a place you stay. In Paris alone, autumn 2026 brings a cluster of openings that mix training, recovery and a social space: Rune (10e, six training zones + sauna/cold plunge + restaurant + coworking, expected Sept 2026), Hyria Wellness House (17e, "performance & longevity club", Sept 2026, €195–590/month), NXT LVL (16e, 1,700 m² inside Stade Jean-Bouin, opened 2 Sept 2026, contrast therapy + café), Haus One (9e, members-only "Move / Recover / Connect", Oct 2026) and Impact ("social sport club" with padel + cross-training + sauna, Oct 2026). They follow La Montgolfière Lamarck (18e, 5,800 m², Oct 2025, €195/month), RE-SET (9e, social sauna club, March 2026, 6,000 bookings in its first month), Sant Roch (1er, 400 m², largest sauna in France) and Soho House adding a Soho Health Club to its Paris house.
The same pattern is already funded abroad. Bathhouse (NYC) raised $35M in 2025–26 to go from 3 to 10 sites; Othership (Toronto/NYC) raised $8.5M in 2025 for its 4th site; Remedy Place runs 4 "social wellness clubs" at $300–2,750/month; Life Time calls itself an "athletic country club", did ~$3B revenue in 2025 (+14%) and is opening 12–14 large-format clubs in 2026; Third Space London is at 14 clubs at £273–325/month with 3 more in 2026; 1Rebel is adding cold plunges, saunas and F&B to its London studios. McKinsey's 2025 wellness study puts the global market at ~$2T and names in-person wellness services as a high-growth area; the Global Wellness Summit called "super-social clubs" a 2025 trend and "festivalised" sauna culture a 2026 one.
The VC read · Where the story breaks
On "social clubs are a thing". Seven openings in one Paris autumn is a supply signal, not a demand signal — it can just as well be the top of a cycle (United Fitness Brands closed in London and its Chelsea flagship went to 1Rebel, Blok closed Manchester, boutique fitness has a graveyard). None of the Paris clubs has published unit economics; Rune, Haus One and Impact have not even published a price. Paris is 2M people at 20,000/km² with a 54% cadre share in the 10e; Marseille's premium supply today tops out at €69–209/month and the 6e/8e are the only districts that resemble the persona. The honest version of the trend is "validated in Paris, unproven anywhere else in France" — which is both the opportunity and the risk, and the story should say so. A VC will also ask why La Montgolfière itself, which took outside investors in 2024, will not open in Marseille or Lyon before we do.
Health is the new reason to train
What it means for us: people are willing to pay for health, not for machines. A club that measures (VO2max, blood, body composition) and programs from the data sits exactly where the spend is going.
The trend · Read the evidence
Europe's fitness market hit a record in 2025: 75.5M members (+5.8%), €39bn revenue (+9%), penetration 9.3% of the population. France is the laggard: ~6.2–7M members, ~9–10% penetration, against 14.8% in Germany, 16.6% in the UK, ~24% in the Netherlands and 26% in the US. That gap is the headroom. And the motivation has shifted: 52% of French exercisers now cite health first (+6 pts since 2018), 46% cite wellbeing (+6), only 34% appearance; 61% of French adults now practise regularly (+7 pts since 2018).
The under-30s are leading. 50% of new gym sign-ups in France are under 30; in the US, 18–24s have the highest penetration of any age group (35.5%); UK Gen Z train ≥2×/week at 73% (62% a year earlier), spend £49/month on fitness (+17%), and 44% train to socialise. Around them, the "measure your health" layer has become a consumer category: WHOOP (2.5M members, $10bn valuation, now sells blood panels), Oura (5.5M rings, >$500M revenue), Function Health (200k members, $2.5bn valuation), and in France Lucis ($20M Series A in May 2026, 10k+ users, 110+ biomarkers).
The VC read · Where the story breaks
On health and gym growth. The growth in European penetration is overwhelmingly low-cost: Basic-Fit has 894 clubs in France at €25/month, Fitness Park added 19% clubs last year; the French average subscription is ~€33/month. We are asking for 5–7× that — so the comparison set has to be boutique studios, not gyms. There the numbers hold: outside Paris a reformer/Lagree class is €28–38, a 10-pack €25–35 per class, unlimited €220–350/month (Marseille, Aix, Bordeaux, Lyon), and two classes a week already cost €250–300/month. The counter-risk is the local bundler: SET Marseille sells gym + reformer + Hyrox training for €90–130 per four weeks, and Wellness Sport Club Prado has a pool and 160 classes a week at €59/month. Our €179 has to be visibly more than "classes plus a gym" — the spa, the lab and the place are what justify the gap. The under-30 numbers cut both ways: Gen Z has the highest participation and the lowest disposable income (£49/month in the UK study); our persona is 30–45 CSP+, so the Gen Z slide is a cultural signal, not our customer. "Health as motivation" says nothing about willingness to pay €179 in a city where median income is below Paris. And the biomarker layer that makes the concept feel modern is being built by companies with 100× our budget (WHOOP, Oura, Function, Lucis) — we should be their distribution, not compete with them.
Running and the outdoors are the new social life
What it means for us: Marseille is one of the best outdoor playgrounds in France. The club is the base camp — the run and trail club leaves from here, and comes back here to recover. Outdoor is our acquisition channel and recovery is our product.
The trend · Read the evidence
France now counts 12.4M runners (6.6M in 2000), 40% under 35, 42% women, and 74% of them also run trail. Races are sold out faster than concerts: Semi de Paris 2026, 50,000 runners, sold out in hours; Marathon de Paris 2026, 58,853 starters (3rd largest in the world), 49% first-timers; Marseille-Cassis, 20,000 bibs gone in one hour. Trail races in France doubled since 2015 to 5,900 in 2025, with 1.44M finishers. Hyrox went past 1.5M participants in 2025/26 and targets 2M+ in 2026/27; Paris will race at the Grand Palais in 2027.
The social layer is what changed. Strava counts 1M clubs (running clubs up 3.5× in 2025), run-club participation grew 59% in 2024, and 58% of people say they made friends through a fitness group. Gen Z are 39% more likely than Gen X to use sport to meet people; the "run club is the new night out" headline is now mainstream. Paris has 12+ active run clubs (Flow Club ~2,000 runners); Marseille has a dozen, running the Corniche, the Vieux-Port and the Calanques, plus the biggest open-water event in Europe (Défi de Monte-Cristo, 10,000 swimmers). Brands are built on it: Bandit Running ($30M+ raised, membership $125/year, stores that are clubhouses), Distance (Lyon → Paris → Copenhagen), Hoka ($2.6bn, +16%).
The VC read · Where the story breaks
On running and outdoors. The running boom is free. Run clubs are free, Strava is free, the Calanques are free, and Marseille's climate means the outdoor alternative is available eleven months a year — the very thing that makes the city attractive reduces the need for a gym. Willingness to pay in this trend shows up in events (bibs, Hyrox entries, Bandit's $125/year), not in €179 memberships. The base-camp idea is good but it has to be proven: how many of Marseille's run-club members would pay for recovery, coaching and a place, and how many would just keep running for free? Also note that Hyrox skipped Marseille in 2025 after organisational problems — the local hybrid scene is smaller than Paris or Lyon.
People are lonely, and cities are where it hurts
What it means for us: belonging is why members stay past year one, and staying past year one is the whole economics of a capped, premium club.
The trend · Read the evidence
24% of French adults feel lonely regularly (Fondation de France 2026); it is 28% in cities over 100,000 vs 21% in rural areas, and 35% among 25–39 year-olds — our exact persona — vs 16% of 60–69s. WHO now treats social connection as a health determinant: 1 in 6 people worldwide lonely, ~871,000 deaths a year linked to it. The OECD documents a decline in daily in-person contact with friends since 2006, sharpest among the young. The US Surgeon General's line — lack of connection is as lethal as 15 cigarettes a day — is now standard in every wellness pitch.
The commercially useful evidence is about retention, not loneliness: in a 10,000-member UK study, gym-only members were 56% more likely to cancel than group-exercise members; 81% of Gen Z gym-goers do group workouts; Strava's group activities last 40% longer than solo ones. Community is not the mission statement, it is the churn model.
The VC read · Where the story breaks
On loneliness. The correlation is real, the purchase driver is not. The loneliest groups (unemployed 45%, low-sociability 25–39s) are the least able to pay for a premium club; the people who join a €179 social club are usually the ones who already have a social life. Loneliness is a good opening line and a bad business case. Use it once, then switch to the retention data, which is the number that actually moves the model.
What the story is still missing
- Demand evidence outside Paris. Zero presales, zero waitlist, zero price test in Marseille. The three-week validation protocol is the only answer to this, and it should be in the deck before the trends are.
- The operator. La Montgolfière was a finance founder plus a coach who had run gyms for seven years. We are a growth/AI founder. Who runs the floor, hires 40 coaches, manages a restaurant and a spa? The team slide is currently the weakest slide.
- The building. In this category the building is the product (industrial, high, light). We have no site, no rent quote, no landlord. Capex is a guess until we do.
- The pace contradiction. Our benchmark opened one club every seven years; our plan says five clubs in four years plus franchises. A VC will read the plan as either naïve or as requiring a fundamentally different operating model — we must show which, and what it costs (HQ team, playbook, capital per club).
- Franchising an unproven format. Nobody in France has franchised a 1,500 m² social club; the compact format has no economics yet. Franchise revenue in the EBITDA story is the least defensible line.
- The AI moat is a feature until proven otherwise. Every device and app is shipping an AI coach. Our defensible asset is not the model, it is the proprietary in-club data (tests, attendance, recovery) and the closed loop with a coach. Say that. Also check the regulatory side: blood-test-driven advice in France sits close to medical practice; the partnership with Lucis needs to define who prescribes and who advises.
- Exit and investor fit. Fitness operators trade at mid-single-digit to ~10× EBITDA; VC returns need the network-and-fees layer to be real. Until it is, this is a business-angel / family-office / hospitality-investor story (exactly how La Montgolfière and Bathhouse's early rounds were done), not a VC story. Choosing the right investor is part of the narrative.
- Model consistency. The public dossier says €179 and 1,335 m²; the internal model says €149 and 800 m². Any investor who reads both will stop there.
- Seasonality and churn. Marseille empties in August and fills with tourists; no French premium club has published churn. The 3%/month assumption is borrowed from generic gym data; premium capped clubs should do better, but we have no proof.
- The backlash trend. The Global Wellness Summit's 2026 list includes "over-optimisation backlash". A club that leads with biomarkers and VO2max can read as clinical; leading with the place, the outdoors and the people, with the lab as a quiet layer, is safer.
Bottom line for the narrative: keep the four trends, cut each to three numbers, and put the counter-argument in our own words before the investor does. The credibility comes from the validation protocol and the team, not from the trends.
Reference material
The original documents.
Both drafts are preserved in full. The current financial charts come from the shared Business Model calculator; superseded economics and AI wording remain available above. The source claims and bibliography have not been independently re-verified.
Notes on the club list
Three names from the original list could not be verified as Paris clubs: Blold, The Eight (theeightclub.com is a members' club with no city, fitness content or prices) and Digg — please check spellings or share links. Haus One and Impact open in October, not September. Impact's "Paris 19" address is not published.
Source bibliography
Paris clubs: runeclub.fr; Numéro (30 Jul 2026); haus-one.com; impact-paris.com; hyriawellnesshouse.com; nxtlvlclub.com; crea-home.fr; Time Out Paris (31 Oct 2025, 22 Jul 2026); cult.news (8 Jun 2026); Journal du Luxe (28 Jul 2026); Luxus+ (3 Sep 2026); sohohouse.com House Notes 006. US/UK: Athletech News (Bathhouse $35M, 12 May 2026; Othership, 3 Jul 2025; Sweat and Tonic, Jul 2026); Fortune "social wellness clubs"; remedyplace.com; Fitt Insider (May 2022); Life Time FY2025 preliminary results (22 Jan 2026); Health Club Management (Third Space Whiteley; 1Rebel); luxe.digital (Equinox 2026 pricing); McKinsey Future of Wellness 2025; Global Wellness Summit trends 2025 and 2026. Fitness market: EuropeActive/Deloitte EHFMR 2026 via SGI Europe; HFA 2026 US report; LeisureDB UK 2025; Union Sport & Cycle / Xerfi via MagicFit; Basic-Fit FY2025; Filière Sport (Fitness Park, 11 May 2026); INJEP/CRÉDOC Baromètre des pratiques sportives 2025; ABC Fitness Wellness Watch (Oct 2025); The Gym Group Gen Z Fitness Pulse 2025; GWI Wellness Economy Monitor 2025; WHOOP Series G (31 Mar 2026); Oura (Sep/Oct 2025); Sacra (Function Health); lucis.life (26 May 2026). Running/outdoor: Strava Year in Sport 2024 and 2025; Observatoire du Running 2025 (Union Sport & Cycle / Running Heroes); athle.fr (FFA licences 2025); Baromètre Finisher FFA 2024 and 2025 (u-Trail, Filière Sport 25 Aug 2026); Jogging International (Semi 2026); marathons.com (Marathon de Paris 2026); u-Trail (Marseille-Cassis 2025); Maritima (Défi de Monte-Cristo 2025); endurance.biz (Hyrox 2026/27); zonehybrid.fit and roxzone.fr (Hyrox France/Marseille); utmb.world (2025 season, UTMB×Strava); Paris Wellness Review, Run Club Collective (Marseille); Deckers FY2026 (Hoka); Brand Futures (Bandit). Boutique pricing (Sept 2026 rate cards): studio-apato.com, wondercamp.fr, setmarseille.com, capsulepilatesclub.com, lagreelab.fr, soda-studio.fr, yesclubstudio.com, beyond-cycling.studio, o2trainingclub.fr, reformer-factory.com, crossfit-symbiote.fr, wellness-sportclub.fr, cnmarseille.com (2025 grid), silostudio.fr, episod.com, studio-rituel.paris; Mariana Tek Boutique Fitness Trends 2026. Loneliness: Fondation de France, Étude Solitudes 2025 and 2026; OECD, Social Connections and Loneliness in OECD Countries (Oct 2025); WHO Commission on Social Connection (30 Jun 2025); US Surgeon General advisory (May 2023); gov.uk Community & Engagement Survey 2025/26; Hillsdon/TRP retention study via Health Club Management; Les Mills Gen Z report (Apr 2024); PLOS Global Public Health (parkrun, 2024).